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ABSTRACT
Component-based software development has posed a serious chal-
lenge to system verification since externally-obtained components
could be a new source of system failures. This issue can not be
completely solved by either model-checking or traditional software
testing techniques alone due to several reasons: (1) externally ob-
tained components are usually unspecified/partially specified; (2)
it is generally difficult to establish adequacy criteria for testing a
component; (3) components may be used to dynamically upgrade
a system. This paper introduces a new approach (called model-
checking driven black-box testing) that combines model-checking
with traditional black-box software testing to tackle the problem in
a complete, sound, and automatic way. The idea is to, with respect
to some requirement (expressed in CTL or LTL) about the system,
use model-checking techniques to derive a condition (expressed
in a communication/witness graph) for an unspecified component
such that the system satisfies the requirement iff the condition is
satisfied by the component. The condition’s satisfiability can be es-
tablished by testing the component with test-cases generated from
the condition on-the-fly. In this paper, we present algorithms for
model-checking driven black-box testing, which handle both CTL
and LTL requirements for systems with unspecified components.
We also illustrate the ideas through some examples.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.4 [Software Engineering]: Software/Program Verification—
Formal methods, Model-checking; D.2.5 [Software Engineering]:
Testing/Debugging—Black-box testing; F.4.1 [Mathematic Logic
and Formal Languages]: Mathematical Logic—Temporal Logic
General Terms
Verification, Component-based systems
Keywords
Component-based system, Model-checking, Black-box testing
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
Copyright 200X ACM X-XXXXX-XX-X/XX/XX ...$5.00.
1. INTRODUCTION
Component-based software development [21, 7] is a systematic
engineering method to build software systems from prefabricated
software components that are previously developed by the same or-
ganization, provided by third-party software vendors, or even pur-
chased as commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products. Though this
development method has gained great popularity in recent years, it
has also posed serious challenges to the quality assurance issue of
component-based software since externally obtained components
could be a new source of system failures. The issue is of vital
importance to safety-critical and mission-critical systems. For in-
stance, in June 1996, during the maiden voyage of the Ariane 5
launch vehicle, the launcher veered off course and exploded less
than one minute after taking off. The report [25] of the Inquiry
Board indicates that the disaster resulted from insufficiently tested
software reused from the Ariane 4. The developers had reused cer-
tain Ariane 4 software component in the Ariane 5 without substan-
tially testing it in the new system, having assumed that there were
no significant differences in these portions of the two systems.
Most of the current work addresses the issue from the viewpoint
of component developers: how to ensure the quality of components
before they are released. However, this view is obviously insuffi-
cient: an extensively tested component (by the vendor) may still not
perform as expected in a specific deployment environment, since
the systems where a component could be deployed may be quite
different and diverse and they may not be tried out by its vendor.
So, we look at this issue from system developers’ point of view:
(*) how to ensure that a component functions correctly
in the host system where the component is deployed.
In practice, testing is almost the most natural resort to resolve this
issue. When integrating a component into a system, system devel-
opers may have three options for testing: (1) trust the component
provider’s claim that the component has undergone thorough test-
ing and then go ahead to use it; (2) extensively retest the component
alone; (3) hook the component with the system and conduct inte-
gration testing. Unfortunately, all of the three options have some
serious limitations. Obviously, for systems requiring high reliabil-
ity, the first option is totally out of the question. The second option
may suffer from the following fact. Software components are gen-
erally built with multiple sets of functionality [16], and indiscrim-
inately testing all the functionality of a software component is not
only expensive but sometimes also infeasible, considering the po-
tentially huge state space of the component interface. Additionally,
it is usually difficult to know when the testing over the component
is adequate. The third option is not always applicable. This is be-
cause, in many applications, software components could be applied
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for dynamic upgrading or extending a running system [35] that is
costly or not supposed to shut down for retesting at all. Even with-
out all the above limitations, purely testing-based strategies are still
not sufficient to establish the solid confidence for a reliable compo-
nent required by mission-critical or safety-critical systems, where
formal methods like model-checking are highly desirable. How-
ever, one fundamental obstacle for using a formal method to ad-
dress the issue of (*) is that design details or source code of an ex-
ternally obtained software component is generally not fully avail-
able to the developers of its host system. Thus, existing formal
verification techniques (like model-checking) are not directly ap-
plicable.
Clearly, this problem plagues both component-based software
systems and some hardware systems with a modularized design.
Generally, we call such systems as systems with unspecified compo-
nents (in fact, in most cases, the components are partially specified
to which our approach still applies.).
In this paper, we present a new approach, called model-checking
driven black-box testing, which combines model-checking tech-
niques and black-box testing techniques to deal with this problem.
The idea is simple yet novel: with respect to some temporal re-
quirement about a system with an unspecified component, a model-
checking based technique is used to derive automatically a condi-
tion about the unspecified component from the rest of the system.
This condition guarantees that the system satisfies the requirement
iff the condition is satisfied by the unspecified component, which
can be checked by adequate black-box testing over the unspecified
component with test-cases generated automatically from the condi-
tion.
We provide algorithms for both LTL and CTL model-checking
driven black-box testing. In the algorithms, the condition men-
tioned earlier is represented as communication graphs and witness
graphs, on which a bounded and nested depth-first search procedure
is employed to run black-box testing over the unspecified compo-
nent. Our algorithms are both sound and complete.
Though we do not have an exact complexity analysis result, our
preliminary studies show that, in the liveness testing algorithm for
LTL, the maximal length of test-cases run on the component is
bounded by O(n ·m2). For CTL, the length is bounded by O(k ·
n ·m2). In here, k is the number of CTL operators in the formula
to be verified, n is the state number in the host system, andm is the
state number in the component.
The advantages of our approach are obvious: a stronger confi-
dence about the reliability of the system can be established through
both formal verification and adequate functional testing; system de-
velopers can customize the testing with respect to some specific
system properties; intermediate model-checking results (the com-
munication and witness graphs) can be reused to avoid (repetitive)
integration testing when the component is updated, if only the new
component’s interface remains the same; our algorithms are both
sound and complete; most of all, the whole process can be carried
our in an automatic way.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
some background on temporal logics LTL and CTL along with our
model of systems containing unspecified components. The main
body of the paper consists of Section 3 and Section 4, which pro-
pose algorithms for LTL and CTL model-checking driven black-
box testing, respectively, over the system model. Section 5 illus-
trates the algorithms through an example. Section 6 lists some of
the related work. Section 7 concludes the paper with some further
issues to be resolved in the future.
Details on some algorithms are omitted in this extended abstract.
At http://www.eecs.wsu.edu/∼gxie, a full version of this paper is
available.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 The System Model
In this paper, we consider systems with only one unspecified
component (the algorithms generalize to systems with multiple un-
specified components). Such a system is denoted by
Sys = 〈M,X〉,
where M is the host system and X is the unspecified component.
Both M and X are finite-state transition systems communicating
synchronously with each other via a finite set of input and output
symbols.
Formally, the unspecified component X is defined as a deter-
ministic Mealy machine whose internal structure is unknown (but
an implementation of X is available for testing). We write X as
a triple 〈Σ,∇,m〉, where Σ is the set of X’s input symbols, ∇ is
the set of X’s output symbols, and m is an upper bound for the
number of states in X (as a convention in black-box testing, the m
is given). Assume that X has an initial state sinit. A run of X is
a sequence of symbols alternately in Σ and ∇: α0β0α1β1..., such
that, starting from the initial state sinit, X outputs exactly the se-
quence β0β1... when it is given the sequence α0α1... as input. In
this case, we say that the input sequence is accepted by X .
The host system M is defined as a 5-tuple
〈S,Γ, Renv , Rcomm, I〉
where
• S is a finite set of states;
• Γ is a finite set of events;
• Renv ⊆ S × Γ × S defines a set of environment transitions
where (s, a, s′) ∈ Renv means that M moves from state s
to state s′ upon receiving an event (symbol) a ∈ Γ from the
outside environment;
• Rcomm ⊆ S × Σ × ∇ × S defines a set of communica-
tion transitions where (s, α, β, s′) ∈ Rcomm means that M
moves from state s to state s′ when X outputs a symbol
β ∈ ∇ after M sends X an input symbol α ∈ Σ; and,
• I ⊆ S is M ’s initial states.
Without loss of generality, we further assume that, there is only one
transition between any two states in M (but M , in general, could
still be nondeterministic).
An execution path of the system Sys = 〈M,X〉 can be repre-
sented as a (potentially infinite) sequence τ of states and symbols,
s0c0s1c1..., where each si ∈ S, each ci is either a symbol in Γ or
a pair αiβi (called a communication) with αi ∈ Σ and βi ∈ ∇.
Additionally, τ satisfies the following requirements:
• s0 is an initial state of M , i.e., s0 ∈ I ;
• for each ci ∈ Γ, (si, ci, si+1) is an environment transition of
M ;
• for each ci = αiβi, (si, αi, βi, si+1) is a communication
transition of M .
The communication trace of τ , denoted by τX , is the sequence
obtained from τ by retaining only symbols in Σ and ∇ (i.e., the
result of projecting τ onto Σ and ∇). For any given state s ∈ S,
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we say that the system Sys can reach s iff Sys has an execution
path τ on which s appears and τX (if not empty) is also a run ofX .
In the case whenX is fully specified, the system can be regarded
as an I/O automaton [26].
2.2 Model-checking
Model-checking[9, 33, 10, 36, 20] is an automatic technique
for verifying a finite-state system against some temporal specifi-
cation. The system is usually represented by a Kripke structure
K = 〈S,R,L〉 over a set of atomic propositions AP , where
• S is a finite set of states;
• R ⊆ S × S is the (total) transition relation;
• L : S → 2AP is a function that labels each state with the set
of atomic propositions that are true in the state.
The temporal specification can be expressed in, among others,
a branching-time temporal logic (CTL) or a linear-time temporal
logic (LTL). Both CTL and LTL formulas are composed of path
quantifiers A and E, which denote “for all paths” and “there ex-
ists a path”, respectively, and temporal operators X , F , U and G,
which stands for “next state”, “eventually”, “until”, and “always”,
respectively.
More specifically, CTL formulas are defined as follows:
• Constants true and false, and every atomic proposition in
AP are CTL formulas;
• If f1 and f2 are CTL formulas, then so are ¬f1, f1∧f2, f1∨
f2, f1 → f2, EX f1, AX f1, EF f1, AF f1, E[f1 U f2],
A[f1 U f2], EG f1, AG f1.
Due to duality, any CTL formula can be expressed in terms of
¬,∨, EX,EU and EG. A CTL model-checking problem, formu-
lated as
K, s |= f
, is to check whether the CTL formula f is true at a state s. For
example, AF f is true at state s if f will be eventually true on all
paths from s; E[f U g] is true at state s if there exists a path from
s on which f is true at each step until g becomes true.
LTL formulas, on the other hand, are all in the form ofA f where
f is a path formula defined as follows:
• Constants true and false, and every atomic proposition in
AP are path formulas;
• If f1 and f2 are path formulas, then so are ¬f1, f1 ∧ f2,
f1 ∨ f2, X f1, F f1, [f1 U f2], G f1.
An LTL model-checking problem, formulated as
K, s |= A f
, is to check whether the path formula f is true on all paths from
a state s. For example, AFG f is true at s if on all paths from s,
after a future point f will be always true; AGF f is true at s if on
all paths from s, f will be true infinitely often.
More detailed background in model-checking and temporal log-
ics can be found in the textbook [11]. The system Sys = 〈M,X〉
defined earlier can be understood as a Kripke structure (with a given
labeling function and atomic propositions over states in M ). Since
X is an unspecified component, in the rest of the paper, we mainly
focus on how to solve the LTL/CTL model-checking problems on
the Sys through black-box testing on X .
2.3 Black-box Testing
Black-box testing (also called functional testing) is a technique
to test a system without knowing its internal structure. The sys-
tem is regarded as a “black-box” in the sense that its behaviour
can only be determined by observing (i.e., testing) its input/output
sequences. As a common assumption in black-box testing, the un-
specified component X (treated as a black-box) has a special input
symbol reset which always makes X return to its initial state re-
gardless of its current state. We use Experiment(X,resetpi) to
denote the output sequence obtained from the input sequence pi,
when X runs from the initial state (caused by the reset). After
running this Experiment, suppose that we continue to run X by
providing an input symbol α following the sequence pi. Corre-
sponding to this α, we may obtain an output symbol β from X .
We use Experiment(X,α) to denote the β. Notice that this latter
Experiment is a shorthand for “the last output symbol in
Experiment(X,resetpiα)”.
Studies have shown that if only an upper bound for the number
of states in the system and the system’s inputs set are known, then
its (equivalent) internal structure can be fully recovered through
black-box testing. Clearly, a naive algorithm to solve the LTL/CTL
model-checking problem over the Sys is to first recover the full
structure of the component X through testing, and then to solve
the classic model-checking problem over the fully specified system
composed from M and the recovered X . Notice that, in the naive
algorithm, when we perform black-box testing overX , the selected
test-cases have nothing to do with the host system M . Therefore,
it is desirable to find more sophisticated algorithms such as the
ones discussed in this paper, that only select “useful” test-cases wrt
the M as well as the temporal specification of M that needs to be
checked.
3. LTL MODEL-CHECKING DRIVEN
BLACK-BOX TESTING
In this section, we introduce algorithms for LTL model-checking
driven black-box testing for the system Sys = 〈M,X〉 defined
earlier. We first show how to solve a liveness analysis problem.
Then, we discuss the general LTL model-checking problem.
3.1 Liveness Analysis
The liveness analysis problem (also called the infinite-often prob-
lem) is to check: starting from some initial state s0 ∈ I , whether
the system Sys can reach a given state sf for infinitely many times.
When M has no communications with the unspecified compo-
nent X , solving the problem is equivalent to finding a path p that
runs from s0 to sf and a loop C that passes sf . However, as far
as communications are involved, the problem gets more compli-
cated. The existence of the path p does not ensure that the system
can indeed reach sf from s0 (e.g., communications with X may
never allow the system to take the necessary transitions to reach
sf ). Moreover, the existence of the loop C does not guarantee that
the system can run along C forever either (e.g., after running along
C for three rounds, the system may be forced to leave C by the
communications with X).
We approach this infinite-often problem in three steps. First, we
look at whether a definite answer to the problem is possible. If we
can find a path from s0 to sf and a loop from sf to sf that involve
only environment transitions, then the original problem (i.e., the
infinite-often problem) is definitely true. If such a path and a loop,
no matter what transitions they may involve, do not exist at all,
then the original problem is definitely false. If no definite answer
is possible, we construct a directed graph G and use it to generate
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test-cases for the unspecified component X . The graph G, called
a communication graph, is a subgraph of M , represents all paths
and loops in M that could witness the truth of the problem (i.e.,
paths that run from s0 to sf and loops that pass sf ). The graph G
is defined as a pair 〈N,E〉, where N is a set of nodes and E is a
set of edges. Each edge of G is annotated either by a pair αβ that
denotes a communication of M with X , or has no annotation. We
construct G as follows.
• Add one node to G for each state in M that is involved in
some path between s0 and sf or in a loop that passes sf ;
• Add one edge between two nodes in N if M has a transition
between two states corresponding to the two nodes respec-
tively. If the transition involves a communication with X ,
then annotate the edge with the communication symbols.
It is easy to see that the liveness analysis problem is true if and only
if the truth is witnessed by a path in G. Therefore, the last step is
to check whether G has a path along which the system can reach
sf from s0 first and then reach sf for infinitely many times. More
details of this step are addressed in the next subsection.
See appendix B.1 for details on the above operations.
3.2 Liveness Testing
To check whether the constructed communication graph G has a
path that witnesses the truth of the original problem, the straightfor-
ward way is to try out all paths inG and then check, whether along
some path, the system can reach sf from s0 first and then reach sf
for infinitely many times. The check is done by testing X with the
communication trace of the path to see whether it is a run of X .
However, one difficulty is that G may contain loops, and certainly
we can only test X with a finite communication trace. Fortunately,
the following observations are straightforward:
• To check whether the system can reach sf from s0, we only
need to consider paths with length less thanmn1 where n1 is
the maximal number of communications on all simple paths
(i.e., no loops on the path) between s0 and sf in G, and m
is an upper bound for the number of states in the unspecified
component X;
• To check whether the system can reach from sf to sf for
infinitely many times, we only need to make sure that the
system can reach sf for m − 1 times, and between sf and
sf , the system goes through a path no longer than n2 that is
the maximal number of communications on all simple loops
(i.e., no nested loops along the loop) in G that pass sf .
Let n = max(n1, n2). The following procedure TestLiveness
uses a bounded and nested depth-first search to traverse the graph
G while testing X . It first tests whether the system can reach sf
from s0 along a path with length less thanmn, then it tests whether
the system can further reach sf to sf for m − 1 more times. The
algorithm maintains a sequence of input symbols that has been suc-
cessfully accepted by X , an integer variable level that records how
many communications have been gone through without reaching
sf , and an integer variable count that indicates how many times
sf has been reached. At each step, it chooses one candidate from
the set of all possible input symbols at a node, and feeds the in-
put sequence concatenated with the candidate input symbol to X .
If the candidate input symbol and the output symbol (correspond-
ing to the candidate input symbol) ofX match the annotation of an
edge originating from the node, the procedure moves forward to try
the destination node of the edge with level increased by 1. If there
is no match, then the procedure tries other candidates. But before
trying any other candidate, we need to bring X to its initial state by
sending it the special input symbol reset. The procedure returns
false when all candidates are tried without a match, or when more
than mn communications have been gone through without reach-
ing sf . After sf is reached, the procedure increases count by 1 and
resets level to 0. The procedure returns true when it has already
encountered sf for m times.
Procedure TestLiveness(X,pi, s0, sf , level, count)
If level > mn Then
Return false;
Else If s0 = sf Then
If count >= m Then
Return true;
Else
count := count+ 1; level := 0;
For each (s0, s′) ∈ E Do
Experiment(X,resetpi);
If TestLiveness(X,pi, s′, sf , level, count) Then
Return true;
Inputs := {α|(s0, αβ, s
′) ∈ E};
For each α ∈ Inputs Do
Experiment(X,resetpi);
β := Experiment(X,α);
If ∃s′ : (s0, αβ, s′) ∈ E Then
If TestLiveness(X,piα, s′, sf , level + 1, count)
Then Return true;
Return false.
In summary, our liveness testing algorithm to solve the liveness
analysis problem has two steps: (1) build the communication graph
G; (2) return the truth of
TestLiveness(X,reset, s0, sf , level = 0, count = 0).
3.3 LTL Model-Checking Driven Testing
Recall that the LTL model-checking problem is, for a Kripke
structure K = 〈S,R,L〉 with a state s ∈ S and a path formula f ,
to determine if K, s |= A f . Notice that K, s |= A f if and only if
K, s |= ¬E ¬f . Therefore it is sufficient to only consider formulas
in the formE f . The standard LTL model-checking algorithm [11]
first constructs a tableau T for the path formula f . T is also a
Kripke structure and includes every path that satisfies f . Then the
algorithm composes T withK and obtains another Kripke structure
P which includes exactly the set of paths that are in both T and K.
Thus, a state in K satisfiesE f if and only if it is the start of a path
(in the composition P ) that satisfies f .
Define sat(f) to be the set of states in T that satisfy f and use
the convention that (s, s′) ∈ sat(f) if and only if s′ ∈ sat(f). The
LTL model-checking problem can be summarized by the following
theorem [11]:
THEOREM 1. K, s |= E f if and only if there is a state s′ in
T such that (s, s′) ∈ sat(f) and P, (s, s′) |= EG true under
fairness constraints {sat(¬(g U h) ∨ h) | g U h occurs in f}.
Note that the standard LTL model-checking algorithm still ap-
plies to the system Sys = 〈M,X〉, although it contains an unspec-
ified component X. To see this, the construction of the tableau T
from f and the definition of sat are not affected by the unspecified
component X . The composition of Sys and T is a new system
Sys′ = 〈P,X〉 where P is the composition of M and T . Then
one can show
COROLLARY 1. 〈M,X〉, s |= E f if and only if there is a state
s′ in T such that (s, s′) ∈ sat(f) and 〈P,X〉, (s, s′) |= EG true
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under fairness constraints {sat(¬(g U h) ∨ h) | g U h occurs in
f}.
Obviously, checking whether there is a state s′ in T such that
(s, s′) ∈ sat(f) is trivial. To check whether 〈P,X〉, (s, s′) |=
EG true under the fairness constraints is equivalent to checking
whether there is computation in 〈P,X〉 that starts from (s, s′) and
on which the fairness constraints are true infinitely often. One
can show that this is equivalent to the liveness analysis problem
we studied in the previous subsection, and thus, the LTL model-
checking problem can be solved by extending our algorithms for
the liveness analysis problem. Moreover, the algorithms are both
complete and sound.
4. CTL MODEL-CHECKING DRIVEN
BLACK-BOX TESTING
In this section, we introduce algorithms for CTL model-checking
driven black-box testing for the system Sys = 〈M,X〉.
4.1 Ideas
Recall that the CTL model-checking problem is, for a Kripke
structure K = (S,R,L), a state s0 ∈ S, and a CTL formula f ,
to check whether K, s0 |= f holds. The standard algorithm [11]
for this problem operates by searching the structure and, during the
search, labeling each state s with the set of subformulas of f that
are true at s. Initially, labels of s are just L(s). Then, the algorithm
goes through a series of stages—during the i-th stage, subformulas
with the (i− 1)-nested CTL operators are processed. When a sub-
formula is processed, it is added to the labels for each state where
the subformula is true. When all the stages are completed, the algo-
rithm returns true when s0 is labeled with f , or false otherwise.
However, if a system is not completely specified, the standard
algorithm does not work. This is because, in the system Sys =
〈M,X〉, transitions ofM may depend on communications with the
unspecified component X . In this section, we adapt the standard
CTL model-checking algorithm [11] to handle the system Sys (i.e.,
to check whether
〈M,X〉, s0 |= f
holds where s0 is an initial state inM and f is a CTL formula over
M ).
The new algorithm follows a structure similar to the standard
one. It also goes through a series of stages to search M ’s state
space and label each state during the search. However, during a
stage, processing the subformulas is rather involved, since the truth
of a subformula h at a state s can not be simply decided (it may de-
pend on communications). Similar to the algorithm for the liveness
analysis problem, our ideas here are to construct a graph represent-
ing all the paths that witness the truth of h at s. But, the new al-
gorithm is far more complicated than the liveness testing algorithm
for LTL, since the truth of a CTL formula is usually witnessed by a
tree instead of a single path. In the new algorithm, processing each
subformula h is sketched as follows.
When h takes the form of EX g, E[g1 U g2], or EG g, we con-
struct a graph that represents exactly all the paths that witness the
truth of h at some state. We call such a graph the subformula’s wit-
ness graph (WG), written as JhK. We also call JhK an EX graph, an
EU graph, or an EG graph if h takes the form ofEX g,E[g1 U g2],
or EG g, respectively.
Let k be the total number of CTL operators in f . In the algo-
rithm, we construct k WGs, and for each WG, we assign it with a
unique ID number that ranges between 2 and k + 1. (The ID num-
ber 1 is reserved for constant true.) Let I be the mapping from
the WGs to their IDs; i.e., I(JhK) denotes the ID number of h’s
witness graph, and I−1(i) denotes the witness graph with i as its
ID number, 1 < i ≤ k + 1. We label a state s with ID number 1
if h is true at s and the truth does not depend on communications
between M and X . Otherwise, we label s with 2 ≤ i ≤ k + 1 if
h could be true at s and the truth would be witnessed only by some
paths which start from s in I−1(i) and, on which, communications
are involved.
When h takes the form of a Boolean combination of subformulas
using ¬ and ∨, the truth of h at state s is also a logic combination of
the truths of the component subformulas at the same state. To this
end, we label the state with an ID expression ψ defined as follows:
• ID := 1 | 2 | . . . | k + 1;
• ψ := ID | ¬ψ | ψ ∨ ψ.
Let Ψ denote the set of all ID expressions. For each subformula h,
we construct a labeling (partial) function Lh : S → Ψ to record
the ID expression labeled to each state during the processing of
the subformula h, and the labeling function is returned when the
subformula is processed.
The detailed procedure, called ProcessCTL, for processing
subformulas will be given in Section 4.2. After all subformulas are
processed, a labeling function Lf for the outer-most subformula
(i.e., f itself) is returned. The algorithm returns true when s is la-
beled with 1 by Lf . It returns false when s is not labeled at all. In
other cases, a testing procedure over X is applied to check whether
the ID expression labeled in Lf (s) could be evaluated true. The
procedure, called TestWG, will be given in Section 4.3. In sum-
mary, the algorithm (to solve the CTL model-checking problem
〈M,X〉, s0 |= f ) is sketched as follows:
Procedure CheckCTL(M,X, s0, f)
Lf := ProcessCTL(M,f)
If s0 is labeled by Lf Then
If Lf (s0) = 1 Then
Return true;
Else
Return TestWG(X,reset, s0, Lf (s0));
Else (i.e., s0 is not labeled at all)
Return false.
4.2 Processing a CTL formula
Processing a CTL formula h is implemented through a recur-
sive procedure ProcessCTL. Recall that any CTL formula can be
expressed in terms of ∨, ¬,EX ,EU , andEG. Thus, at each inter-
mediate step of the procedure, depending on whether the formula h
is atomic or takes one of the following forms: g1 ∨ g2, ¬g, EX g,
E[g1 U g2], or EG g, the procedure has only six cases to consider
and when it finishes, a labeling function Lh is returned for formula
h.
Procedure ProcessCTL(M,h)
Case
h is atomic: Let Lh label every state with 1
whenever h is true on the state;
h = g1 ∨ g2:
Lg1 := ProcessCTL(M,g1);
Lg2 := ProcessCTL(M,g2);
Lh := HandleUnion(Lg1 , Lg2);
h = ¬g:
Lg := ProcessCTL(M,g);
Lh := HandleNegation(M,Lg);
h = EX g:
Lg := ProcessCTL(M,g);
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Lh := HandleEX(M,Lg);
h = E [g1 U g2]:
Lg1 := ProcessCTL(M,g1);
Lg2 := ProcessCTL(M,g2);
Lh := HandleEU(M,Lg1 , Lg2);
h = EG g:
Lg := ProcessCTL(M,g);
Lh := HandleEG(M,Lg);
Return Lh.
In the above procedure, when h = g1 ∨ g2, we first process g1 and
g2 respectively by calling ProcessCTL, then construct a labeling
function Lh for h by merging (i.e., HandleUnion, see Appendix
B.2 for details)) g1 and g2’s labeling functions Lg1 and Lg2 as
follows:
• For each state s that is in both Lg1 ’s domain and Lg2 ’s do-
main, let Lh label s with 1 if either Lg1 or Lg2 labels s with
1 and label s with ID expression Lg1(s)∨Lg2 (s) otherwise;
• For each state s that is in Lg1 ’s domain (resp. Lg2 ’s domain)
but not in Lg2 ’s domain (resp. Lg1 ’s domain), let L label s
with Lg1(s) (resp. Lg2(s)).
When h = ¬g, we first process g by calling ProcessCTL,
then construct a labeling function Lh for h by “negating” (i.e.,
HandleNegation, see Appendix B.3 for details)) g’s labeling func-
tion Lg as follows:
• For every state s that is not in the domain of Lg , let Lh label
s with 1;
• For each state s that is in the domain of Lg but not labeled
with 1 by Lg , let Lh label s with ID expression ¬Lg(s).
The remaining three cases (i.e., for EX , EU , and EG) in the
above procedure are more complicated and are handled in the fol-
lowing three subsections respectively.
4.2.1 Handling EX
When h = EXg, g is processed first by ProcessCTL. Then,
the procedure HandleEX is called with g’s labeling function Lg
to construct a labeling function Lh and create a witness graph for h
(we assume that, whenever a witness graph is created, the current
value of a global variable id, which initially is 2, is assigned as
the ID number of the graph, and id is incremented by 1 after it is
assigned to the graph).
The labeling function Lh is constructed as follows. For each
state s that has a successor s′ in the domain of Lg , if s can reach
s′ through an environment transition and s′ is labeled with 1 by Lg
then let Lh also label s with 1, otherwise let Lh label s with the
current value of the global variable id.
The witness graph for h = EXg, called anEX graph, is created
as a triple:
JhK = 〈N,E,Lg〉,
where N is a set of nodes and E is a set of annotated edges. It is
created as follows:
• Add one node toN for each state that is in the domain of Lg .
• Add one node to N for each state that has a successor in the
domain of Lg .
• Add one edge between two nodes in N to E when M has a
transition between two states corresponding to the two nodes
respectively; if the transition involves a communication with
X then annotate the edge with the communication symbols.
WhenHandleEX finishes, it increases the global variable id by 1
(since one new witness graph has been created).
See Appendix B.4 for details.
4.2.2 Handling EU
The case when h = E [g1 U g2] is more complicated. We first
process g1 and g2 respectively by calling ProcessCTL, then call
procedureHandleEU with g1 and g2’s labeling functions Lg1 and
Lg2 to construct a labeling function Lh and create a witness graph
for h.
We construct the labeling function Lh recursively. First, let Lh
label each state s in the domain of Lg2 with Lg2(s). Then, for
state s that has a successor s′ in the domain of Lh, if both s and
s′ is labeled with 1 by Lg1 and Lh respectively and s can reach s′
through an environment transition then let Lh also label s with 1,
otherwise letLh label swith the current value of the global variable
id. Notice that, in the second step, if a state s can be labeled with
both 1 and the current value of id, let Lh label s with 1. Thus, we
can ensure that the constructed Lh is indeed a function.
The witness graph for h, called an EU graph, is created as a
4-tuple:
JhK := 〈N,E,Lg1 , Lg2〉,
where N is a set of nodes and E is a set of edges. N is constructed
by adding one node for each state that is in the domain of Lh, while
E is constructed in the same way as that of HandleEX . When
HandleEU finishes, it increases the global variable id by 1.
See Appendix B.5 for details.
4.2.3 Handling EG
To handle formula h = EGg, we first process g by calling
ProcessCTL, then call procedure HandleEG with g’s labeling
functionLg to construct a labeling functionLh and create a witness
graph for h.
The labeling function Lh is constructed as follows. For each
state s that can reach a loop C through a path p such that every
state (including s) on p and C is in the domain of Lg , if every state
(including s) on p and C is labeled with 1 by Lg and no commu-
nications are involved on the path and the loop, then let Lh also
label s with 1, otherwise let Lh label s with the current value of the
global variable id.
The witness graph for h, called an EG graph, is created as a
triple:
JhK := 〈N,E,Lg〉,
where N is a set of nodes and E is a set of annotated edges. The
graph is constructed in a same way as that of HandleEU . When
HandleEG finishes, it also increases the global variable id by 1.
See Appendix B.6 for details.
4.3 Testing a Witness Graph
As mentioned in Section 4.1, the procedure for CTL model-
checking driven black-box testing, CheckCTL, consists of two
parts. The first part, which was discussed in Section 4.2, includes
ProcessCTL that processes CTL formulas and creates witness
graphs. The second part is to evaluate the created witness graphs
through testing X . We will elaborate on this second part in this
section.
In processing the CTL formula f , a witness graph is constructed
for each CTL operator in f and a labeling function is constructed
for each subformula of f . As seen from the algorithm CheckCTL
(at the end of Section 4.1), the algorithm either gives a definite
“yes” or “no” answer to the CTL model-checking problem, i.e.,
6
〈M,X〉, s0 |= f , or it reduces the problem to checking whether
the ID expression ψ labeled to s0 can be evaluated true at the state.
The evaluation procedure is carried out by the following recursive
procedure TestWG, after an input sequence pi has been accepted
by the unspecified component X .
Procedure TestWG(X,pi, s0, ψ)
Case
ψ = ψ1 ∨ ψ2:
If TestWG(X,pi, s0, ψ1) Then
Return true;
Else
Return TestWG(X,pi, s0, ψ2)
ψ = ¬ψ1:
Return ¬TestWG(X,pi, s0, ψ1)
ψ = 1:
Return true;
ψ = i with 2 ≤ i ≤ k + 1:
When I−1(i) is an EX graph
Return TestEX(X,pi, s0, I−1(i));
When I−1(i) is an EU graph
Return TestEU(X,pi, s0, I−1(i), level = 0);
When I−1(i) is an EG graph
Return TestEG(X,pi, s0, I−1(i)).
In TestWG, the first three cases are straightforward, which are
consistent with the intended meaning of ID expressions. The cases
TestEX,TestEU,TestEG for evaluating EX,EU , EG graphs
are discussed in the following three subsections.
4.3.1 TestEX
The case for checking whether an EX graph G = 〈N,E,Lg〉
can be evaluated true at a state s0 is simple. We just test whether
the system M can reach from s0 to another state s′ ∈ dom(Lg)
through a transition in G such that the ID expression Lg(s′) can be
evaluated true at s′.
See Appendix B.7 for details.
4.3.2 TestEU
To check whether an EU graph G = 〈N,E,Lg1 , Lg2〉 can be
evaluated true at a state s0, we need to traverse all paths p inGwith
length less than mn and test the unspecified component X to see
whether the system can reach some state s′ ∈ dom(Lg2) through
one of those paths. In here, m is an upper bound for the number
of states in the unspecified component X and n is the maximal
number of communications on all simple paths between s0 and s′.
In the meantime, we should also check whether Lg2(s′) can be
evaluated true at s′ and whether Lg1(si) can be evaluated true at si
for each si on p (excluding s′) by calling TestWG.
See Appendix B.8 for details.
4.3.3 TestEG
For the case to check whether an EG graph G = 〈N,E,Lg〉
can be evaluated true at a state s0, we need to find an infinite path
in G along which the system can run forever.
The following procedure TestEG first decomposes G into a set
of SCCs. Then, for each state sf in the SCCs, it calls another
procedure SubTestEG to test whether the system can reach sf
from s0 along a path not longer than mn, as well as whether the
system can further reach sf from sf form−1 times. The basic idea
of SubTestEG (see Appendix B.9 for details) is similar to that of
the TestLiveness algorithm in Section 3.2, except that we need
also check whether Lg(si) can be evaluated true at si for each state
si that has been reached so far by calling TestWG. Here, m is the
same as before while n is the maximal number of communications
on all simple paths between s0 and sf .
Procedure TestEG(X,pi, s0, G = 〈N,E,Lg〉)
SCC := {C|C is a nontrivial SCC of G};
T :=
⋃
C∈SCC
{s|s ∈ C};
For each s ∈ T Do
Experiment(X,resetpi);
If SubTestEG(X,pi, s0, s,G, level = 0, count = 0);
Return true;
Return false.
In summary, to solve the CTL model-checking problem
(M,X), s0 |= f,
our algorithm CheckCTL in Section 4.1 either gives a definite
yes/no answer or gives a sufficient and necessary condition in the
form of ID expressions and witness graphs. The condition is evalu-
ated through black-box testing over the unspecified component X .
The evaluation process will terminate with a yes/no answer to the
model-checking problem. One can show that our algorithm is both
complete and sound.
5. EXAMPLES
In this section, to better understand our algorithms, we look at
some examples1.
s0 s1
s3
s2msg?
msg?
send/yes
ack/yes
Figure 1
Consider a system Sys = 〈M,X〉 where M keeps receiving
messages from the outside environment and then transmits the mes-
sage through the unspecified component X . The only event symbol
in M is msg, while X has two input symbols send and ack, and
two output symbols yes and no. The transition graph of M is de-
picted in Figure 1 where we use a suffix ? to denote events from
the outside environment (e.g., msg?), and use a infix / to denote
communications of M with X (e.g., send/yes).
Assume that we want to solve the following LTL model-checking
problem
(M,X), s0 |= EGFs2
i.e., starting from the initial state s0, the system can reach state s1
infinitely often. Applying our liveness analysis algorithms, we can
obtain the (minimized) communication graph in Figure 2.
s1’ s2’
send/yes
ack/yes
Figure 2
From this graph and our liveness testing algorithms, the system
satisfies the liveness property iff the communication trace
send yes(send yes ack yes)m−1
1The transition graphs in the figures in this section are not made
total for the sake of readability.
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is a run of X , where m is an upper bound for number of states
in X . Now, we slightly modified the transition graph of M into
Figure 3 such that when a send fails, the system shall return to the
initial state.
s0 s1
s3
s2
msg?
send/yes
ack/yes
msg?
send/no
Figure 3
For this modified system, its (minimized) communication graph
with respect to the liveness property would be as shown in Figure
4.
s1’ s2’
send/yes
send/no
ack/yes
Figure 4
From Figure 4 and the liveness testing algorithms, the system
satisfies the liveness property iff there exist 0 ≤ k1, k2 ≤ 2m such
that the communication trace
(send no)k1send yes((send yes ack yes)(send no)k2)m−1
is a run of X .
Still consider the system in Figure 3, but we want to solve a CTL
model-checking problem (M,X), s0 |= AFs2; i.e., along all paths
from s0, the system can reach state s1 eventually. The problem is
equivalent to
(M,X), s0 |= ¬EG¬s2.
Applying our CTL algorithms to formula h = EG¬s2, we con-
struct an EG witness graph G = 〈N,E,Ltrue〉 whose ID number
is 2 and a labeling function Lh, where Ltrue labels all three states
s0,s1, and s3 with ID expression 1 (as defined in Section 4.1, which
stands for true), and Lh labels all three states s0, s1, and s3 with
2. The graph G is depicted in Figure 5. From this graph as well
as Lh, the algorithms conclude that the model-checking problem is
true iff the communication trace (send no)m−1 is not a run of X .
s1
send/no
s0 s3
Figure 5
Now we modify the system in Figure 1 into a more complicated
one shown in Figure 6. For this system, we want to check
(M,X), s0 |= ¬E[¬s2Us3]
i.e., starting from the initial state s0, the system should never reach
state s3 earlier than it reaches s2. Applying our CTL algorithms to
formula
h = E[¬s2Us3],
we obtain an EU witness graph G = 〈N,E,L1, L2〉 whose ID
number is 2 and a labeling function Lh, where L1 labels all four
s0 s1 s2
ack/yes
msg?
msg?
msg?
send/yes
s4 ack/yes
send/no
s3
Figure 6
states s0, s1, s3 and s4 with 1, L2 just labels s3 with 1, and Lh
labels states s0, s1, and s4 with 2, and labels s3 with 1. The graph
G is depicted in Figure 7. From this graph as well as Lh, the algo-
rithms conclude that the model-checking problem is true iff none of
communication traces in the form of send no(ack yes send no)∗
and with length less than 3m is a run of X .
s0 s1
s4 ack/yes
send/no
s3
Figure 7
For the same system, we could consider more complicated tem-
poral properties as follows:
• (M,X) |= AG(s2 → AFs3); i.e., starting from the initial
state s0, whenever the system reaches s2, it would eventually
reach s3.
• (M,X), s0 |= AG(s2 → AXA[¬s2Us3]); i.e., starting
from the initial state s0, whenever it reaches state s2, the
system should never reach s2 again until it reaches s3.
We do not include the witness graphs and labeling functions for
these two cases in this extended abstract. Nevertheless, it can be
concluded that the two problems are true iff no communication
traces with two consecutive symbol pairs (send yes) can be runs
of X .
See Appendix C.1 and Appendix C.2 for details about the above
two examples.
6. RELATED WORK
The quality assurance problem for component-based software
has attracted lots of attention in the software engineering commu-
nity, as witnessed by recent publications in conferences like ICSE
and FSE. However, most of the work is based on the traditional
testing techniques and considers the problem from the viewpoint
of component developers; i.e., how to ensure the quality of compo-
nents before they are released.
Voas [37, 38] proposed a component certification strategy with
the establishment of independent certification laboratories perform-
ing extensive testing of components and then publishing the results.
Technically, this approach would not provide much improvement
for solving the problem, since independent certification laborato-
ries can not ensure the sufficiency of their testing either, and a
testing-based technique alone is not enough to a reliable software
component. Some researchers [34, 28] suggested an approach to
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augment a component with additional information to increase the
customer’s understanding and analyzing capability of the compo-
nent behavior. A related approach [39] is to automatically extract a
finite-state machine model from the interface of a software compo-
nent, which is delivered along with the component. This approach
can provide some convenience for customers to test the component,
but again, how much a customer should test is still a big problem.
To address the issue of testing adequacy, Rosenblum defined in [32]
a conceptual basis for testing component-based software, by intro-
ducing two notions of C-adequate-for-P and C-adequate-for-M
(with respect to certain adequacy criteria) for adequate unit testing
of a component and adequate integration testing for a component-
based system, respectively. But this is still a purely testing-based
strategy. In practice, how to establish the adequacy criteria is an
unclear issue.
Recently, Bertolino et. al. [5] recognized the importance of test-
ing a software component in its deployment environment. They
developed a framework that supports functional testing of a soft-
ware component with respect to customer’s specification, which
also provides a simple way to enclose with a component the devel-
oper’s test suites which can be re-executed by the customer. Yet
their approach requires the customer to have a complete specifica-
tion about the component to be incorporated into a system, which is
not always possible. McCamant and Ernst [27] considered the issue
of predicting the safety of dynamic component upgrade, which is
part of the problem we consider. But their approach is completely
different since they try to generate some abstract operational ex-
pectation about the new component through observing a system’s
run-time behavior with the old component.
In the formal verification area, there has been a long history of
research on verification of systems with modular structure (called
modular verification [31]). A key idea [23, 18] in modular verifica-
tion is the assume-guarantee paradigm: A module should guaran-
tee to have the desired behavior once the environment with which
the module is interacting has the assumed behavior. There have
been a variety of implementations for this idea (see, e.g., [2]). How-
ever, the assume-guarantee idea does not immediately fit with our
problem setup since it requires that users must have clear assump-
tions about a module’s environment.
In the past decade, there has also been some research on com-
bining model-checking and testing techniques for system verifi-
cation, which can be classified into a broader class of techniques
called specification-based testing. But most of the work only uti-
lizes model-checkers’ ability of generating counter-examples from
a system’s specification to produce test cases against an implemen-
tation [8, 19, 13, 15, 4, 6, 3].
Peled et. al. [30, 17, 29] studied the issue of checking a black-
box against a temporal property (called black-box checking). But
their focus is on how to efficiently establish an abstract model of
the black-box through black-box testing , and their approach re-
quires a clearly-defined property (LTL formula) about the black-
box, which is not always possible in component-based systems.
Kupferman and Vardi [22] investigated module checking by con-
sidering the problem of checking an open finite-state system under
all possible environments. Module checking is different from the
problem in (*) mentioned at the beginning of the paper in the sense
that a component understood as an environment in [22] is a spe-
cific one. Fisler et. al. [14, 24] proposed an idea of deducing
a model-checking condition for extension features from the base
feature, which is adopted to study model-checking feature-oriented
software designs. Their approach relies totally on model-checking
techniques; their algorithms have false negatives and do not handle
LTL formulas.
7. DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we present algorithms for LTL and CTL model-
checking driven black-box testing. The algorithms create commu-
nication graphs and witness graphs, on which a bounded and nested
depth-first search procedure is employed to run black-box testing
over the unspecified component. Our algorithms are both sound
and complete. Though we do not have an exact complexity analy-
sis result, our preliminary studies show that, in the liveness testing
algorithm for LTL, the maximal length of test-cases fed into the
unspecified component X is bounded by O(n ·m2). For CTL, the
length is bounded by O(k · n · m2). In here, k is the number of
CTL operators in the formula to be verified, n is the state number
in the host system, and m is the state number in the component.
The next natural step is to implement the algorithms and see how
well they work in practice. In the implementation, there are further
issues to be addressed.
7.1 Practical Efficiency
Similar to the traditional black-box testing algorithms to check
conformance between Mealy machines, the theoretical (worst-case)
complexities are high in order to achieve complete coverage. How-
ever, worst-cases do not always occur in a practical system. In
particular, we need to identify scenarios that our algorithms can
be made more efficient. For instance, using existing ideas of ab-
straction [12], we might obtain a smaller but equivalent model of
the host system before running the algorithms. We might also,
using additional partial information about the component, to de-
rive a smaller state number for the component and to find ways
to expedite the model-checking process. Notice that the number
is actually the state number for a minimal automaton that has the
same set input/output sequences as the component. Additionally,
in the implementation, we also need a database to record the test
results that have been performed so far (so repeated testing can
be avoided). Algorithms are needed to make use of the test re-
sults to aggressively trim the communication/witness graphs such
that less test-cases are performed but the complete coverage is still
achieved. Also, we will study algorithms to minimize communi-
cation/witness graphs such that duplicate test-cases are avoided.
Lastly, it is also desirable to modify our algorithms such that the
communication/witness graphs are generated with the process of
generating test-cases and performing black-box testing over the un-
specified component X . In this way, a dynamic algorithm could be
designed to trim the graphs on-the-fly.
7.2 Coverage Metrics
Sometimes, a complete coverage will not be achieved when run-
ning the algorithms on a specific application system. In this case, a
coverage metric is needed to tell how much the test-cases that have
run so far cover. The metric will give a user some confidence on the
partial model-checking results. Furthermore, such a metric would
be useful in designing conservative algorithms to debug/verify the
temporal specifications that sacrifice the complete coverage but still
bring the user reasonable confidence.
7.3 More Complex System Models
The algorithms can be generalized to systems containing mul-
tiple unspecified components. Additionally, we will also consider
cases when these components interacts between each other, as well
as cases when the host system communicates with the components
asynchronously. Obviously, when the unspecified component (as
well as the host system) has an infinite-state space, both the tra-
ditional model-checking techniques and black-box techniques are
not applicable. One issue with infinite-state systems is that, the in-
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ternal structure of a general infinite-state system can not be learned
through the testing method. Another issue is that model-checking
a general infinite-state system is an undecidable problem. It is
desirable to consider some restricted classes of infinite-state sys-
tems (such as real-time systems modeled as timed automata [1])
where our algorithms generalize. This is interesting, since through
the study we may provide an algorithm for model-checking driven
black-box testing for a real-time system that contains an (untimed)
unspecified component. Since the algorithm will generate test-
cases for the component, real-time integration testing over the com-
posed system is avoided.
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APPENDIX
A. DEFINITIONS
Rsenv := {(s, s
′)|∃ a ∈ Γ : (s, a, s′) ∈ R};
Rscomm := {(s, s
′)|∃ α ∈ Σ, β ∈ ∇ : (s, α,∇, s′) ∈ Rcomm};
Rs := Rsenv ∪R
s
comm;
RTenv := TranstiveClosure(R
s
env);
RT := TranstiveClosure(Rs);
Integer id := 1;
B. ALGORITHMS
B.1 Liveness Analysis
Procedure CheckIO(〈M,X〉, s0, sf )
N := ∅; E := ∅;
If (s0, sf ) ∈ RTenv ∧ (sf , sf ) ∈ RTenv Then
Return “Yes”;
Else if (s0, sf ) 6∈ RT ∧ (sf , sf ) 6∈ RT Then
Return “No”;
End if
N := {s|(s0, s) ∈ R
T ∧ (s, sf ) ∈ R
T )};
E := {(s, s′)|s, s′ ∈ N : (s, a, s′) ∈ Renv}
∪ {(s, αβ, s′)|s, s′ ∈ N : (s, α, β, s′) ∈ Rcomm};
Return TestIO(X, reset, s0, sf , level = 0, count = 0);
End procedure
B.2 Union of Labeling Functions
Procedure Union(L1, L2)
L := ∅;
For each s ∈ dom(L1) ∪ dom(L2) Do
If s ∈ dom(L1) ∩ dom(L2) Then
If L1(s) = 1 ∨ L2(s) = 1 Then
L := L ∪ {(s, 1)};
Else
L := L ∪ {(s, L1(s) ∨ L2(s))};
End if
Else if s ∈ dom(L1) Then
L := L ∪ {(s, L1(s))};
Else
L := L ∪ {(s, L2(s))};
End if
End for
Return L;
End procedure
B.3 Negation of a Labeling Function
Procedure Negation(M,L1)
L := ∅;
For each s ∈ S Do
If s 6∈ dom(L1) Then
L := L ∪ {(s, 1)};
Else if f(s) 6= 1 Then
L := L ∪ {(s,¬L1(s))};
End if
Return L;
End procedure
B.4 Checking an EX Subformula
Procedure HandleEX(M,L1)
N := dom(L1); L := ∅;
For each t ∈ dom(L1) Do
For each s : Rs(s, t) Do
N := N ∪ {s}
If L1(t) = 1 ∧Rsenv(s, t) Then
If s 6∈ dom(L) Then
L := L ∪ {(s, 1)};
Else if L(s) 6= 1 Then
L := L|s←1;
End if
Else if s 6∈ dom(L) Then
L := L ∪ {(s, id)};
End for
End for
End if
E := {(s, s′)|s′ ∈ dom(f) ∧ ∃a : (s, a, s′) ∈ Renv}
∪{(s, αβ, s′)|s′ ∈ dom(f)∧(s, α, β, s′) ∈ Rcomm};
Associate id with G = 〈N,E,L1〉; id := id+ 1;
Return L;
End procedure
B.5 Checking an EU Subformula
Procedure HandleEU(M,L1, L2)
L := L2;
T1 := dom(L1); T2 := dom(L);
While T2 6= ∅ Do
Choose t ∈ T2; T2 := T2 \ {t};
For each s ∈ T1 ∧Rs(s, t) Do
If L1(s) = 1 ∧ L(t) = 1 ∧Rsenv(s, t) Then
If s 6∈ dom(L) Then
T2 := T2 ∪ {s}; L := L ∪ {(s, 1)};
Else if L(s) 6= 1 Then
T2 := T2 ∪ {s}; L := L|s←1;
End if
Else if s 6∈ dom(L) Then
T2 := T2 ∪ {s}; L := L ∪ {(s, id)};
End if
End for
End while
N := dom(L);
E := {(s, s′)|s, s′ ∈ N ∧ ∃a : (s, a, s′) ∈ Renv}
∪ {(s, αβ, s′)|s, s′ ∈ N ∧ (s, α, β, s′) ∈ Rcomm};
Associate id with G = 〈N,E,L1, L2〉; id := id+ 1;
Return L;
End procedure
B.6 Checking an EG Subformula
Procedure HandleEG(X,pi, s0, G = 〈N,E,Lg〉)
SCCenv := {C|C is a nontrivial SCC ofM and C contains
no communication transitions };
SCCcomm := {C|C is a nontrivial SCC of M and C con-
tains some communication transitions };
L := {(s, 1)|∃C ∈ SCCenv : s ∈ C}
∪{(s, id)|∃C ∈ SCCcomm : s ∈ C}
T := dom(L);
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While T 6= ∅ Do
Choose t ∈ T ; T := T \ {t};
For each s ∈ dom(L1) ∧ Rs(s, t) Do
If L(t) = 1 ∧ L1(s) = 1 ∧Rsenv(s, t) Then
If s 6∈ dom(L) Then
T := T ∪ {s}; L := L ∪ {(s, 1)};
Else if L(s) 6= 1 Then
T := T ∪ {s}; L := L|s←1;
End if
Else if s 6∈ dom(L) Then
T := T ∪ {s}; L := L ∪ {(s, id)};
End if
End for
End While
N := dom(L);
E := {(s, s′)|s, s′ ∈ N ∧ ∃a : (s, a, s′) ∈ Renv}
∪ {(s, αβ, s′)|s, s′ ∈ N ∧ (s, α, β, s′) ∈ Rcomm};
Associate id with G = 〈N,E,L1〉; id := id+ 1;
Return L;
End procedure
B.7 Testing an EX Graph
The algorithm for testing an EXgraph is simple. It first checks
whether L1(s′) can be evaluated true at any state s′ such that the
system can reach s′ from s0 through an environment transition. It
returns true if it is the case. Otherwise,it chooses one candidate
from the set of all possible input symbols from s0, and feeds the
sequence pi concatenated with the input symbol to X . If the out-
put symbol of X and the input symbol matches the annotation of
an edge originating from the node, it moves forward to try the des-
tination node of the edge. If there is no match, then it tries other
candidates. But before trying any other candidate, it brings X to its
initial state by sending it the special input symbol, reset. The algo-
rithm returns false when all candidates are tried without a match.
Procedure TestEX(X,pi, s0, G = 〈N,E,L1〉)
For each (s0, s′) ∈ E : s′ ∈ dom(L1) Do
Experiment(X,resetpi);
If TestWG(X,pi, s′, L1(s′)) Then
Return true;
End if
End for
Inputs := {α|∃β : (s0, αβ, s
′) ∈ E};
For each α ∈ Inputs Do
Experiment(X,resetpi);
β := Experiment(X,α);
If ∃s′ : (s0, αβ, s′) ∈ E Then
If TestWG(X,piα, s′, L1(s′)) Then
Return true;
End if
End if
End for each;
Return false;
End procedure
B.8 Testing an EU Graph
The procedure TestEU keeps a sequence of input symbols pi
that has been successfully accepted by X and an integer level that
records how many communications have been gone through with-
out reaching a destination state. And the algorithm works as fol-
lows. At first, it checks whether it has gone through more than
mn communications without success, it returns false if it is the
case. Then, it checks whether it has reached a destination state
(i.e., s0 ∈ dom(L2)). If it is the case, it returns true when L2(s0)
can be evaluated true s0. Next, it checks whether L1(s0) can be
evaluated true at s0, it returns false if it is not the case. After that,
it checks whether L1(s′) can be evaluated true at any state s′ such
that the system can reach s′ from s0 through an environment tran-
sition. It returns true if it is the case. Otherwise,it chooses one
candidate from the set of all possible input symbols from s0, and
feeds the sequence pi concatenated with the input symbol to X . If
the output symbol of X and the input symbol matches the anno-
tation of an edge originating from the node, it moves forward to
try the destination node of the edge with level increased by 1. If
there is no match, then it tries other candidates. But before trying
any other candidate, it brings X to its initial state by sending it the
special input symbol, reset. The algorithm returns false when all
candidates are tried without a match.
Procedure TestEU(X,pi, s0, G = 〈N,E,L1, L2〉, level)
If level > mn Then2
Return false;
Else if s0 ∈ dom(L2) Then
If TestWG(X,pi, s0, L2(s0)) Then
Return true;
End if
Else if not TestWG(X,pi, s0, L1(s0)) Then
Return false;
End if
For ∃s′ : (s0, s′) ∈ E Do
Experiment(X,resetpi);
If TestEU(X,pi, s′, G, level) Then
Return true;
End if
End for
Inputs := {α|(s0, αβ, s
′) ∈ E};
For each α ∈ Inputs Do
Experiment(X,resetpi);
β := Experiment(X,α);
If ∃s′ : (s0, αβ, s′) ∈ E Then
If TestEU(X,piα, s′, G, level + 1) Then
Return true;
End if
End if
End for each;
Return false;
End procedure
B.9 Subroutine for Testing an EG Graph
The procedure SubTestEG keeps a sequence of input symbols
that has been successfully accepted by X , an integer level that
records how many communications have been gone through with-
out reaching sf , and an integer count that indicates how many
times sf has been reached. It first checks whether it has gone
through more than mn communications without reaching sf , it re-
turns false if it is the case. Then, it checks whether it has reached
the given state sf . If it is the case, it returns true when it has al-
ready reached sf for m times, it increases count by 1 and resets
level to 0 when otherwise. The next, it tests whether L1(s0) can
be evaluated true at s0, and it returns false if it is not the case. After
that it checks whether L1(s′) can be evaluated true at any state s′
such that the system can reach s′ from s0 through an environment
transition. It returns true if it is the case. Otherwise, it chooses
one candidate from the set of all possible input symbols from s0,
and feeds the sequence pi concatenated with the input symbol to
2Here, n always denotes the maximal number of communications
on any simple paths in G.
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X . If the output symbol of X and the input symbol matches the
annotation of an edge originating from the node, it moves forward
to try the destination node of the edge with level increased by 1.
If there is no match, it tries other candidates. But before trying
any other candidate, it brings X to its initial state by sending it the
special input symbol reset. The algorithm returns false when all
candidates are tried without a match.
Procedure
SubTestEG(X,pi, s0, sf , G = 〈N,E,L1〉, level, count)
If level > mn Then 2
Return false;
Else if s0 = sf Then
If count >= m Then
Return true;
Else
count := count+ 1; level := 0;
End if
Else if not TestWG(X,pi, s0, L1(s0)) Then
Return false;
End if
For ∃s′ : (s0, s′) ∈ E Do
Experiment(X,resetpi);
If SubTestEG(X,pi, s′, sf , G, level, count) Then
Return true;
End if
End for
Inputs := {α|(s0, αβ, s
′) ∈ E};
For each α ∈ Inputs Do
Experiment(X,resetpi);
β := Experiment(X,α);
If ∃s′ : (s0, αβ, s′) ∈ E Then
If SubTestEG(X,piα, s′, sf , G, level+1, count)
Then
Return true;
End if
End if
End for;
Return false;
End procedure
C. EXAMPLES
C.1 Check (M,X) |= AG(s2 → AFs3)
To check whether (M,X) |= AG(s2 → AFs3), is equivalent
to checking whether
(M,X) |= ¬E[true U(s2 ∧EG¬s3)].
We describe how the formula
f = E[true U(s2 ∧EG¬s3)]
is processed by HandleCTL from bottom to up as follows.
1. the atomic subformula s2 is processed by HandleCTL, and
a labeling function L1 = {(s2, 1)} is returned;
2. the atomic subformula s3 is processed, and a labeling function
L2 = {(s3, 1)} is returned;
3. to process ¬s3,HandleNegation is called withL2 to return
a labeling function L3 = {(s0, 1), (s1, 1), (s2, 1), (s4, 1)};
4. to process EG¬s3, HandleEG is called with L3 to con-
struct an EG graph G1 = 〈N,E,L3〉 with id 2 (see Figure
8) and return a labeling functionL4 = {(s0, 2), (s1, 2), (s2, 2)};
s0 s1 s2send/yes
Figure 8
5. to process s2∧EG¬s3,HandleNegation andHandleUnion
are called with L1 and L4 to return a labeling function L5 =
{(s2, 2)};
6. to process E[true U(s2 ∧ EG¬s3)], HandleEU is called
with L5 to construct an EUgraph G2 = 〈N,E,L5〉 with id
3 (see Figure 9) and return a labeling function
Lf = {(s0, 3), (s1, 3), (s2, 3), (s3, 3), (s4, 3)}.
s0 s1 s2
ack/yes
send/yes
s4 ack/yes
send/no
s3
Figure 9
Since s0 is labeled by Lf with an ID expression 3 instead of 1
(i.e., true), we need to test whether the ID expression 3 can be
evaluated true at s0 by calling TestWG with s0 and G2. It’s easy
to see that, essentially TestWG would be testing whether some
communication trace (with bounded length) with two consecutive
symbol pairs (send yes) is a run of X . It returns false if such
trace exists, or vice versa.
C.2 Check (M,X), s0 |= AG(s2 → AXA[¬s2Us3])
To check whether (M,X), s0 |= AG(s2 → AXA[¬s2Us3]),
is equivalent to checking whether
(M,X) |= ¬E[true U(s2∧EX(E[¬s3U(s2∧¬s3)]∨EG¬s3))].
We describe how the formula
f = E[true U(s2 ∧EX(E[¬s3U(s2 ∧ ¬s3)] ∨EG¬s3))]
is processed by HandleCTL from bottom to up as follows.
1. the atomic subformula s2 is processed by HandleCTL, and
a labeling function L1 = {(s2, 1)} is returned;
2. the atomic subformula s3 is processed, and a labeling function
L2 = {(s3, 1)} is returned;
3. to process ¬s3,HandleNegation is called withL2 to return
a labeling function L3 = {(s0, 1), (s1, 1), (s2, 1), (s4, 1)};
4. to process s2 ∧ ¬s3, HandleNegation and HandleUnion
are called with L1 and L3 to return a labeling function L4 =
{(s2, 1)};
5. to process E[¬s3U(s2 ∧ ¬s3)], HandleEU is called with
L3 and L4 to construct an EU graph G1 = 〈N,E,L3, L4〉
with id 2 (see Figure 10) and return a labeling function L5 =
{(s0, 2), (s1, 2), (s2, 1)};
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s0 s1 s2send/yes
Figure 10
s0 s1 s2send/yes
Figure 11
6. to process EG¬s3, HandleEG is called with L3 to con-
struct an EG graph G2 = 〈N,E,L3〉 with id 3 (see Figure
11) and return a labeling functionL6 = {(s0, 3), (s1, 3), (s2, 3)};
7. to process E[¬s3U(s2 ∧ ¬s3)] ∨ EG¬s3, HandleUnion
is called with L5 and L6 to return a labeling function L7 =
{(s0, 2 ∨ 3), (s1, 2 ∨ 3), (s2, 1)};
8. to processEX(E[¬s3U(s2∧¬s3)]∨EG¬s3),HandleEX
is called withL7 to construct anEX graphG3 = 〈N,E,L7〉
with id 4 (see Figure 12) and return a labeling function L8 =
{(s0, 4), (s1, 1), (s2, 4), (s3, 4)};
s0 s1 s2send/yes
s3
Figure 12
9. to process s2∧EX(E[¬s3U(s2∧¬s3)]∨EG¬s3),HandleNegation
and HandleUnion are called with L1 and L8 to return a la-
beling function L9 = {(s2, 4)};
10. to processE[true U(s2∧EX(E[¬s3U(s2∧¬s3)]∨EG¬s3))],
HandleEU is called withL9 to construct anEUgraphG4 =
〈N,E,L5〉 with id 5 (see Figure 13) and return a labeling
function
Lf = {(s0, 5), (s1, 5), (s2, 5), (s3, 5), (s4, 5)}.
Since s0 is labeled by Lf with an ID expression 5 instead of 1
(i.e., true), we need to test whether the ID expression 5 can be
evaluated true at s0 by calling TestWG with s0 and G4. It’s easy
to see that, essentially TestWG would be testing whether some
communication trace (with bounded lengtg) with two consecutive
symbol pairs (send yes) is a run of X . It returns false if such
trace exists, or vice versa.
s0 s1 s2
ack/yes
send/yes
s4 ack/yes
send/no
s3
Figure 13
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